



Post-Cold War Combined Naval Operations: Maritime Missions, Attributes and Opportunities

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What I hope to consider

- Address roles of navies after 1991 from a *Combined* perspective
 - Derived from a upcoming book created by Australian, British, Canadian and American authors
- Highlight important characteristics of naval operations in the period
- Suggest historically-based explanations for what makes these operations work

Forthcoming book *You Cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations Since 1991*


- Eight contributors: Australia, United Kingdom (2), Canada and the United States (4)
 - Hope to see publication, 2011
- Addresses four operations to 2003
- Not force-on-force naval warfare
 - No Tsushimas, Jutlands, Leyte Gulfs, although environment demands navies must prepare for riskiest high-end challenges

The Maritime Contribution to Jointness

- “History shows that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:
 - 1. The furtherance and hindrance of military operations ashore.
 - 2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
 - 3. The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e. deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).”
- Sir Julian Corbett, 1909

...From The Sea (1992)

*“...From The Sea
Preparing the
Naval Service
for the 21st
Century”
Sept. 1992.*



Three forms of Interoperability

- The Framework of Doctrine
 - Need to coordinate multinational actions predictably
 - Example of Somalia / UNOSOM
 - STANAGs, EXTACs, ATPs especially MTP-1(D)
“Multinational Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures”
 - Determining influence of ROEs

Interoperability through Exercises (II)

- Exercises include everything between
 - PASSEXs
 - Technical exchanges
 - Practicing warfighting
- Longstanding practice: first large NATO maritime exercise Operation Mainbrace, 1952
- “Coalitions always have seams” and exercises build confidence

Technical Interoperability (III)


- AUSCANZUKUS since 1950s
- NTDS / Link-11
- COWAN / CENTRIXS
- Permit development of Common Maritime Picture
 - (all know what's happening)

Justified by busyness: major post-Cold War USN / allied/ coalition missions

- 1991--Desert Shield / Desert Storm: 6 CVBGs / 3 mos.
- 1991-2003--Iraq sanctions: one CVBG+ / 12 years
- 1994-1996--Adriatic Operation Sharp Guard: 2 ships+ / 30 mos.
- 1994--Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti): 2 CVBGs, one ARG / 1 mo.
- 1995--Operation Deliberate Force: 1 CVBG / 1 mo.
- 1999--Adriatic Operation Allied Force: one CVBG / 2 mos.
- 1999--East Timor: 2 ships / 2 mos.
- 2001-2003--Afghanistan: three CVBGs, three ARGs / 6 mos.
- 2003--Iraq phases 1-4: 4 CSGs, 3 ARGs / 4 mos.

The 1990s—A Busy Decade

Cumulative U.S. Military Response Days by Decade



Iraqi Sanctions, 1991-2003

- Coalition needed time to establish arms, trade embargoes
- “Loose association” marked command relations: complex ROEs
- Relatively ‘leaky’ embargo at first due to local conditions, duration, Iraqi work-arounds
- Increasing familiarity, interoperability, experience built trust; by 1999 MIO much more reliable

Modern MIO begins



Operation Sharp Guard, 1993-1996

- Relatively high threat forward: FRY assets
- Drew on existing NATO SNLF / SNFM, reinforced by WEU
- Segmented operating areas simplified divergent ROE
- 74,000 ships challenged, nearly 6,000 at-sea inspections, >1,400 diversions; special case of *Lido II*
- Success due to longstanding relations, shared doctrine, exercises

MIO comes of age



East Timor—1999 (Operation Stabilise)

- Different mission: support civil peacekeeping ashore
- Multilateral INTERFET force led by Australia: 19 nations
 - *USS Mobile Bay* part of Exercise Crocodile '99
- US ROE highly restrictive: 130 personnel ashore
- ISR, logistics all enabled by multilateral sea power in politically easier fashion

Intervention from the sea



Threat evolves: terrorism, even at sea



Afghanistan, 2001-2003

- Everything came together: extraordinarily broad coalition
- Denial of sea to wide-flung group of terrorists: “Maritime Domain Awareness”
- Differing national commitments aligned neatly by participating navies
 - Something armies and air forces cannot do
- Built upon “human network”

What allied navies brought—and needed

Destroyers/ Frigates	1989 1989	1998 1999	2008 2009
USA	164	99	73
UK	48	35	25
France	41	39	31
Canada	23	17	15
Germany	24	15	15
Denmark	18	8	7
Netherlands	16	16	7
Italy	20	22	14
Spain	21	17	11




There are consequences Alfred T. Mahan didn't emphasize

- Navies don't fight other navies
 - Last ship-to-ship battle 1988 (US-Iran), last ship sunk by a submarine 1982 (UK-Argentina), last submerged submarine sunk in 1971 (India-Pakistan)
- Suggests 21st century navies must not be seen as exclusively kinetic organizations
 - Predecessors never were
 - Contribution to Irregular Warfare?



Interoperability yields flexibility

Organization
for Iraq, 2003



Impact of these operations on *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*

- Initiative of then-CNO Michael Mullen, from 2005 speech on “1,000-ship navy”
 - CS-21 reflects human side of interoperability: “Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged.”



Some cautions for the future

- USN risks creating technology gap
 - Technical interoperability expensive
- Closing seams often requires hard (over?)-working liaison personnel
- Budgets for exchange, liaison often first cuts proposed
- Each operation must be re-brokered in advance

At the end of the day

- Demonstrates long-standing naval cooperation (since 1950s)
- Partner navies can often 'plug-and-play'
- Doctrine permits predictability, closes seams
- Exercises + operations = familiarity, mutual reliance and trust
- Allows participation while never compromising national sovereignty



Questions?